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ABSTRACT 
 
Acton, Douglas R. M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon. December 2008. 
Benefits and costs of hedging the CAD/USD exchange rate and its effect on mitigating 
CWB wheat pool account deficit probabilities.  
Supervisor: Dr. Richard S. Gray 
 
The CWB has the stated objective of increasing producer returns through 
maximizing sales revenue and minimizing operating costs. To maximize producer returns 
the CWB derives value from single-desk selling, price pooling and the initial price 
guarantee. 
The initial price allows the CWB to offer a price floor to producers which is 
guaranteed by the Federal government. This guarantee has come under review in recent 
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations with opponents stating that the Federal 
government is unfairly subsidizing producers. Therefore developing methods to hedge 
the initial payment and remove the CWB dependency on the Federal government 
guarantee has taken on considerable importance.  
Hedging the initial price has two components, the first is commodity risk, and the 
second is currency risk. Commodity risk basically consists of the risk that wheat prices 
decrease significantly from the announcement of the initial payment resulting in a wheat 
pool account deficit. Currency risk relates to the risk of the Canadian dollar (CAD) 
increasing vis-à-vis the United States dollar (USD) resulting in lower wheat prices. This 
is due to the fact most sales are made in USD, necessitating the conversion of USD for 
CAD in order to pay Canadian producers. Given recent increases in exchange rate 
volatility this later risk is important.  
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The goal of this study is to evaluate the currency risk present in the initial 
payment and to examine alternate means of mitigating this risk. A number of call option 
strategies will be evaluated to determine its ability to reduce the probability of a wheat 
pool account deficit by offsetting the effect of a rising CAD. 
The policy variables analyzed in the thesis are the initial payment as a percentage 
of the Pool Return Outlook for wheat and the strike price of the call options purchased. 
Therefore the study will examine the effect of inputting varying initial payment levels 
and different strike prices for the call options in the model. This will allow for 
quantifiable insight into cost versus risk reduction comparisons. These comparisons will 
be useful in determining the most efficient mode of action for the CWB. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the single desk seller of wheat and barley 
produced by western Canadian farmers destined for export markets and for domestic 
human consumption in designated areas of Canada. The CWB has the stated objective of 
increasing producer returns through maximizing sales revenue and minimizing operating 
costs. Three main facets of the CWB from which producers derive value are single-desk 
selling, price pooling and the initial price guarantee (CWB3, 2003).  
The initial price allows the CWB to offer a price floor to producers which is 
guaranteed by the Federal government. This guarantee has come under review in recent 
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations with opponents stating that the Federal 
government is unfairly subsidizing producers. Therefore developing methods to hedge 
the initial payment and essentially remove the CWB dependency on the Federal 
government backing of the initial price has taken on considerable importance.  
Hedging the initial price has two components, the first is commodity risk, and the 
second is currency risk. Commodity risk basically consists of the risk that wheat prices 
decrease significantly from the announcement of the initial payment resulting in a wheat 
pool account deficit. Currency risk relates to the risk of the Canadian dollar (CAD) 
increasing vis-à-vis the United States dollar (USD) resulting in lower wheat prices. This 
is due to the fact most sales are made in USD, necessitating the conversion of USD for 
CAD in order to pay Canadian producers.  
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In theory hedging commodity and currency risk can be accomplished through the 
use of futures and/or options contracts. Shorting wheat futures contracts will protect the 
price of wheat when the hedge is initiated. However this strategy is unable to hedge the 
exact initial price set by the CWB. A more accurate method of hedging the initial 
payment would be the use of wheat put options. The main problem with this strategy is 
the limited availability of traded put options at the initial payment level. For these and 
other reasons, to be discussed further in Chapter two, hedging commodity risk will be 
given minimal attention. Call options will allow for the flexibility to hedge a particular 
exchange rate, offering the most efficient and effective means of reducing increases in the 
CAD and minimizing the probability of a wheat pool account deficit.  
 
1.2 Need for the study 
Previous research has evaluated the value western Canadian producers receive 
through the initial payment guarantee. Unterschultz and Novak, (1997) concluded this 
implicit subsidy was negligible and not a major contributor to market distortions. 
Alternative means of protecting the initial payment have not been evaluated in the 
academic literature perhaps due to the Federal government backing of the initial payment 
guarantee. However recent WTO trade talks have resulted in the slating of government 
financing, the underwriting of losses, and future monopoly powers of the CWB up for 
negotiation. This has resulted in the need to examine methods of protecting the initial 
payment in event the Federal government guarantee is used as a concession for trading 
with other nations. This study looks at ways the CWB can hedge the currency risk 
inherent in offering the initial price for wheat. The study will consequently map out 
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various currency strategies depicting a cost versus deficit reduction matrix for the CWB 
to consider in event the Federal government backing of the initial payment is abolished. 
There is an inherent trade off between the risk reduction and the cost of the strategy. The 
most effective strategy can correspondingly be implemented to mitigate exchange rate 
risk within the initial payment and therefore minimize the probability of a wheat pool 
account deficit. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Uncertainty surrounding the fate of the CWB initial payment guarantee in WTO 
negotiations has stimulated a need to develop alternative means of protecting the initial 
payment for wheat. Pool account deficits occur when the average CAD price for wheat 
falls below a previously announced initial payment level. Declines in CAD wheat sale 
revenue occur when the USD price of grain falls and/or the CAD appreciates vis-à-vis the 
USD. Given recent increases in exchange rate volatility this later risk is important. 
Therefore means of managing the exchange rate risk associated with the initial payment 
requires careful analysis of expected net returns and the risk of future pool account 
deficits.    
 
1.4 Objectives 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the currency risk present in the initial 
payment and to examine alternate means of mitigating this risk. A number of call option 
strategies will be evaluated to determine its ability to reduce the probability of a wheat 
pool account deficit by offsetting the effect of a rising Canadian dollar. 
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This will include examining the effect of inputting varying initial payment levels 
and different strike prices for the call option in the model. This will allow for quantifiable 
insight into cost versus risk reduction comparisons. These comparisons will be useful in 
determining the most efficient mode of action for the CWB. 
 
1.5 Organization of thesis  
 Chapter two contains a detailed look into the relevant literature surrounding the 
CWB and its monopoly position in wheat and barley procurement. The chapter also 
outlines various measures to hedge both commodity and currency risk explaining each 
measures suitability. Lastly it gives a brief introduction into the model used to simulate 
pool account deficits.   
 Chapter three goes into detail explaining the conceptual framework for estimating 
the costs and impacts of implementing the currency hedge. The chapter explains how the 
benefits of the options hedge work to decrease the probability of a pool account deficit 
and how the options premiums are calculated. The simulation model components, inputs 
and policy variables are evaluated to give the reader a better idea of how the information 
from the model will be used to evaluate current and future risk management policy.  
 Chapter four introduces the simulation model used to calculate wheat pool 
account deficit probabilities. This chapter delves into explaining how the wheat and 
exchange rate equations are calculated and implemented into the Monte Carlo simulation 
model. Chapter four is more technical in nature and evaluates how each input is 
calculated in the model and used to generate deficit probabilities. Deficit probabilities are 
simulated for a base scenario in order to generate a benchmark for the study. From this 
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benchmark wheat and exchange rate volatility are adjusted along with call option strike 
prices in order to generate a sensitivity analysis. The results allow policy measures to be 
made by considering initial payment levels and call option strike prices in order to derive 
a balance between option outlays and deficit protection from adverse exchange rate 
movements. 
Chapter five concludes with recommendations and conclusions from the 
simulation results and potential policy actions for the CWB to consider. The chapter also 
outlines future research considerations and limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Review of relevant literature 
 
2.1 CWB overview 
According to the CWB3 (2003), single-desk selling allows the CWB to brand 
Canadian wheat, allowing for premiums to be captured for providing customers with 
consistent quality and quantity.  It also prevents firms or individuals from competing for 
sales and bidding away potential premiums. Benefits are also derived from having 
negotiation leverage when dealing with buyers and services from grain companies and 
rail lines. This feature also allows farmers to benefit from market development and new 
varieties as a result of investment in product development (CWB3, 2003).   
Price pooling allows farmers to receive the same price for their grain regardless of 
when it is delivered in the crop year. This study will look primarily at the wheat pool 
account as it is the largest and commands the most attention should a deficit arise.  
Within the CWB, revenue from grain sales is deposited into five pool accounts wheat, 
durum wheat, designated barley; feed barley pool A and B (CWB3, 2003). All applicable 
classes, grades, and protein levels are placed into each pool as individual sales are made. 
Price differentials are tracked between each class/grade/protein level to determine a final 
pooled “selling price” for each class/grade/protein level.  
A major change was made to feed barley in 2005 when two feed barley pooling 
periods were created in order to give farmers enhanced price signals throughout the year. 
The creation of two pools also improves the CWB’s ability to source deliveries when 
sales opportunities arise (CWB4, 2008). The pool is closed when all grain delivered 
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within the respective crop year is sold (Unterschultz and Novak, 1997). More recently, 
the single desk for export feed barley was removed by Order in Council. This action was 
later reversed by a court decision, with the two single desk pooling accounts remaining in 
effect as of December 2008. 
For each pool account the initial payment provided to prairie farmers is 
guaranteed by the Federal government. Hence if the final pool realized return is less than 
the initial payment, farmers do not have to pay back the difference. The initial payment 
can be seen as a specialized put option1 with an exercise price equal to the initial payment 
provided by Canadian taxpayers to western Canadian farmers (Unterschultz and Novak, 
1997). As grain sales are made during the crop year, and the demand/supply makeup 
becomes clearer, upward adjustments and interim payments can be made to the initial 
payment up until the final payment is issued (Unterschultz and Novak, 1997). 
 
2.2 CWB deficits 
Although pool account deficits do not happen regularly its occurrence stirs up 
contentious debate from wheat producers around the world, especially from the United 
States. The most recent deficit occurred in the crop year 2002/03 when wheat pool 
account had a deficit of $85.4 million. The deficit resulted from a number of factors 
including a late harvested and drought reduced crop, market share gained by usually 
insignificant exporters and the surge in the CAD vis-à-vis the USD. The CAD rose by 
almost 19% compared to the USD over the six months following January 2003, 
beginning at $0.63 USD/CAD and reaching a high of $0.749 USD/CAD in mid June 
                                                 
1 Put option – Allows the buyer the right to sell an asset by a certain date for a certain price (Hull, 1991). 
 8
(Bank of Canada, 2008). This increase substantially reduced wheat selling prices for the 
CWB and was a major contributor to the deficit which shortly followed (CWB1, 2003).   
The previous CWB deficit occurred in the crop year 1990/91 where a deficit near 
$675 million was realized.2 Contributing factors include the increased use of export 
subsidies by the European Union and export programs undertaken by the US announced 
after the initial payment was set. Also during this time export markets were lost to the 
Middle East as a result of the Gulf War. Lower wheat prices followed which forced the 
CWB to sell at below initial payment levels (CBC, 2002). The deficit of 1985/86 was 
also due to the US Export Enhancement Plan, which resulted in the initial payment & 
following adjustment payments falling short of the final sales number by approximately 
$23 million. The crop year 1938/39 produced a deficit of $61.5 million. This deficit was 
mainly due to the initial payment being set well above realistic open market expectations. 
Strong political lobbying pressured the federal government to set the initial payment well 
above market expectations, full knowing a deficit would ensue. During this period a dual 
market structure prevailed, allowing producers to deliver to the CWB or the open market. 
As a result of the initial payment being at such a premium to the open market, farmers 
delivered all of their grain to the CWB. A similar result occurred during the crop year 
1935/36 where a CWB deficit of $12 million occurred. Dual marketing allowed farmers 
to deliver at the open market price when it exceeded the initial payment, and vise versa 
when the initial payment exceeded the open market price. This lead to 70% of deliveries 
going to the CWB, which had to sell the crop at market prices below the initial payment 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that the CWB deficit stemming from a higher initial payment level than final selling 
price would have been picked up by the CFIP/CAIS program to some degree due to overall lower wheat 
sales revenue for producers. 
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received by farmers (CWB2, 2003). Below is a table which summarizes the deficits 
incurred by the CWB.  
 
Table 2.1 - History of CWB deficits: 1976/77 to 2003/04 
  Wheat Durum Barley 
Designated 
barley Oats Total  
2002/03 $85,388,000          $85,388,000 
1990/91 $673,375,352  $69,612,457 $956,713     $743,944,522 
1988/89         $32,361,239  $32,361,239 
1986/87     $92,543,884 $17,970,279   $110,514,163 
1985/86 $22,944,777    $171,370,689   $6,919,810  $201,235,276 
1982/83     $5,544,235     $5,544,235 
1981/82         $2,291,454  $2,291,454 
1979/80         $778,942  $778,942 
1977-79         $4,779,376  $4,779,376 
Total  $781,708,129  $69,612,457 $270,415,521 $17,970,279 $47,130,821  $1,186,837,207 
 
Source: Alta Ag. Food & Rural Dev., Economic & Competitiveness Unit: CWB Government Guarantees 2006. 
 
History has shown that CWB deficits do occur but are quite infrequent. In the 
table above durum, barley, designated barley, and oats have had previous deficits 
however when compared to the wheat pool account the deficits become less of an issue. 
Therefore the wheat pool is the account that will receive the attention for the remainder 
of the study when considering protecting the initial price through currency hedging. Past 
deficits primarily were a result of the dual market and foreign policy changes, and not 
from exchange rate risk. However recent USD/CAD exchange rate fluctuations have 
proven that hedging the CAD is a task not to be overlooked.   
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2.3 CWB and WTO negotiations 
Opponents of the initial payment guarantee state that the Federal government is 
unfairly subsidizing producers (WTO, 2004). In recent World Trade Organization (WTO) 
trade talks the Canadian government’s initial payment guarantee has come to the 
forefront in discussions as part of an effort to eliminate export subsidies.  In a package of 
framework and other agreements approved by all 147 WTO members, government 
financing and underwriting of losses, as well as future rules governing monopoly powers 
will be subject to negotiation. Referring to state trading enterprises the framework reads: 
 
“Trade distorting practices with respect to export state trading enterprises including 
eliminating export subsidies provided to or by them, government financing, and the 
underwriting or losses. The issue of the future use of monopoly powers will be subject to 
further negotiation" (WTO, 2004). 
 
This could result in a loss of the initial price guarantee provided by the Federal 
government to the CWB.  The initial price guarantee is a significant part of the value the 
CWB provides farmers. In the event the government guarantee is banished, means of 
continuing to provide a price floor commands careful consideration.  
In comparison the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) discontinued underwriting 
initial payments to growers in 1999. The Australian government now guarantees a 
percentage of AWB borrowings for its operations (NFU, 2002). The AWB is now a 
publicly traded company which offers producers various programs, from the ability to 
select the timing of grain sales, hedge currency risk, and others providing producers with 
enhanced flexibility.   
 11
Although the initial payment guarantee is a highly contentious issue revolving 
around the CWB, a number of other factors are at play which adds to the mix (Wilson 
and Dahl, 2002). Claims of special privileges and protections which give the CWB unfair 
advantages in grain marketing include: 
 
1. Government borrowing at reduced rates and export credit extensions 
 2. Price pooling 
 3. Lack of price transparency 
 4. Preferential transportation legislation and regulations 
 5. Non-tariff import barriers 
 
In addition to the above claims, it is argued by the U.S. that the CWB is able to 
enter long-term credit sales risk free due to its supply monopoly on Canadian wheat. The 
CWB also has the ability to call supplies at anytime without having to consider market 
signals or prices (Wilson and Dahl, 2002). Commercial firms do not have the ability to 
offer extended credit sales over the long-term due to supply uncertainty.  
The CWB is able to borrow money at the lowest interest rate available due to 
Federal government backing (Wilson and Dahl, 2002). The money is used for daily 
operational activities as well as to lend money to farmers and pay them up front for grain 
not already sold. The CWB has minimal assets to use as collateral for the substantial 
amount of funds it requires, therefore necessitating Federal backing of loaned funds.   
Lack of transparency has many interpretations but basically refers to the lack of 
full disclosure of the cost and pricing structure undertaken by the CWB. The ability of the 
CWB to pool grain allows for special pricing flexibilities and market power not otherwise 
available to other commercial grain firms. Price pooling also contributes to the lack of 
transparency; however various studies examining this issue have mixed views of whether 
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transparency or lack thereof actually contributes to trade distortions (Wilson and Dahl, 
2002). Schmitz and Furtan found that if the CWB were to be replaced by multinationals, 
no greater transparency would result. They argue that the U.S. futures markets are what 
world grain prices are based on. These markets are fundamentally linked to local cash 
markets throughout the world. Accordingly these price relationships are what traders and 
State Trading Enterprises (STE) base their decisions on (Wilson and Dahl, 2002). 
U.S opponents of the CWB argue that certain discriminating rules and regulations 
are in place which results in non-tariff barriers against US imported wheat (Schnepf, 
2004). The Canada Grains Act states that imported wheat cannot be mixed with domestic 
wheat within the elevator system. Canadian law also caps the revenue that railroads can 
generate on the shipment of domestic grain but not on imported grain. Hence, shipping 
fees for imported grain have the potential to be above or below that charged for domestic 
grain. Domestic grain also has preferred treatment to imported grain during the allocation 
of government owned rail cars (Schnepf, 2004). While these policies may have 
discriminatory components to them neither is directly related to the CWB, or the CWB 
Act. 
The above factors including the initial price guarantee are ever pressing issues 
faced by the CWB. Each allegation of such requires careful attention to ensure the CWB 
operates within the guidelines set out during WTO negotiations. The initial price 
guarantee and methods to ensure its viability however will command the attention of this 
study.  
 
 
 13
2.4 Futures hedging 
Hedging in agricultural markets is a well known phenomenon and is described in 
many text books. The brief overview provide below is a summary of the material in 
Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing (1991), which provides a very good overview of the 
theory and practice of agricultural hedging.  
Hedging the initial payment requires attention to both commodity and foreign 
exchange risk. Hedging refers to the simultaneous holding of a position in the 
futures/options market while planning to sell or purchase the physical commodity (Blank, 
Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). The theory is that the two positions offset each other 
essentially locking in a value with a high probability of certainty (Blank, Carter, and 
Schmiesing, 1991). 
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a particular asset, commodity, 
currency at a certain price at a certain time in the future. Futures’ hedging requires a 
margin account to initiate the hedge which the broker holds as security in event the 
position is in a losing situation. A long hedge refers to the purchasing of a futures 
contract typically to reduce price uncertainty when a commodity needs to be purchased in 
the future. If the price of the commodity increases from the time the contract is purchased 
and the time the physical commodity is bought the increase in value of the futures 
contract offsets the higher price paid for the physical commodity at the going spot rate. 
This results in the actualized price paid for the commodity approximately being the going 
spot rate when the hedge was first initiated (Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). 
A short hedge is typically initiated when an individual is long i.e. has a 
commitment to sell a product, in the physical commodity and wishes to sell a futures 
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contract for an upcoming time period to lock in a profit. If the commodity in question 
declines in value, the futures portion of the hedge will profit from the ability to purchase 
the futures contract at a lower price than was paid. This will offset the decrease in value 
from having to sell the physical commodity at a lower price than was available when the 
hedge was first initiated (Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). 
Both the previous hedging examples assume that the basis remains constant 
throughout the hedge. The basis most simply put is the difference between the futures and 
spot price. Economists sometimes refer to it as ‘time and place’ utility. It represents time 
value of money, transportation costs, interest, and varying local demand/supply 
situations. Essentially when an individual initiates a futures hedge, price risk is 
substituted for basis risk. If the basis widens i.e. becomes larger, a short hedger will lose 
some of the effectiveness of the hedge. Conversely, a long hedger will gain from the 
widening of the basis and end up with an actualized selling price greater than anticipated 
(Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). 
 
2.5 Options hedging 
Hull, (1991) describes the use of futures options to reduce price risk. Options 
markets and futures options markets are another outlet with which hedging positions can 
be initiated. An options contract represents the underlying asset where an options futures 
contract represents a futures contract on the underlying asset. Option hedging comes 
closer to providing traditional price insurance than futures markets; derived from the fact 
a floor or ceiling price can be established through their use. A call option is the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy an asset/commodity/currency at a specific price before a certain 
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end date. A put option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell an 
asset/commodity/currency by a certain date for a specific price. This is opposed to futures 
contracts where the holder has the obligation to either deliver or accept delivery of the 
underlying asset. American options can be exercised anytime up until the expiration date, 
while European options can only be exercised on the expiration date (Hull, 1991).  
When an individual purchases a call option, the buyer expects the futures price to 
rise, profiting from the difference between the asset price and exercise price. Call options 
are used for hedging purposes to protect the individual from prices above the strike price, 
essentially providing a price ceiling. A put option on the other hand is purchased when 
the buyer expects the price to fall, or to provide protection from decreasing prices by 
establishing a price floor. The seller or writer of an option receives a premium, which is 
paid by the buyer for the right to control one futures contract.  
The premium of an option is determined by the supply/demand situation for the 
option for a specific time. The premium is affected by many factors including (Blank, 
Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991): 
 
1. The relationship of the strike price to the underlying futures price 
 2. The time remaining until the option expires 
 3. The volatility of the price of the underlying futures contract 
 4. Interest rate levels 
 
When an options exercise price is equal to the spot price the option is trading "at-
the-money", if the option has intrinsic value and time value it is known as trading "in-the- 
money", and when an option has no intrinsic value, and only time value it is known as 
"out-of-the-money". Intrinsic value can be defined as the value the option has if exercised 
immediately or the amount the option is trading in-the-money. Time value is the premium 
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buyers are willing to pay for the expectation that the underlying asset will favorably 
change increasing the value of the option to a profitable level. An options time value 
decreases as the expiration date nears, resulting in only intrinsic value remaining when 
the option expires (Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991).  
As a rule the more volatile the underlying asset, the greater the option premium is. 
This is due to the fact the option has an increased chance of taking on intrinsic value 
sometime before the expiration date. Sellers of options take on more risk by writing 
options with greater volatility and therefore insist on greater time values. Interest rates 
theoretically have the effect of reducing option premiums. This stems from the fact the 
premium paid from buyers generate increased returns for writers due to higher interest 
rates. The time value of the premium increases for option buyers theoretically resulting in 
their demand for lower premiums. However, research shows that in actual market 
operations, the effect of interest rates on option premiums is negligible (Blank, Carter, 
and Schmiesing, 1991).  
The purchaser of an option can do either one of two things during the life of the 
option. Assuming the option is American the buyer can sell it early and receive the 
market value of the option net of transaction costs. The buyer can also choose to exercise 
the option and enter a futures contract or purchase the underlying asset, assuming a call, 
or sell a futures contract or underlying asset if the option is a put. An individual enters the 
futures market through exercising the option, where the individual can either sell/buy 
futures to close out their position or accept/make delivery of the underlying futures asset. 
It should be noted that only a small percentage of futures/option contracts are exercised, 
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however the threat of this action is ultimately what drives the futures and spot price 
together, net of the basis (Atkin, 1989). 
When hedging with options an important factor to consider is the options delta. 
The delta measures the responsiveness of the option premium to the underlying futures 
contract. Delta values usually depend on the extent to which the option is "in" or "out-of-
the- money". Deep "in-the-money" options usually have values close to 1 meaning that 
there is a one-to-one ratio between the underlying futures and the option premium. Deep 
"out-of-the-money" options have a delta value close to zero. This is due to the fact there 
is no intrinsic value within the option only time value. Options "at-the-money" have delta 
values near 0.5, resulting in the option value adjusting approximately half the underlying 
futures move. Therefore when hedging with options a greater amount of coverage may be 
needed than a one-to-one ratio in order to effectively mitigate adverse price swings in the 
futures market (Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). 
An example where option hedging was attempted in the market was the Cattle 
Options Pilot Project (COPP). The COPP was a program allowing producers to purchase 
a put option combining live cattle futures and the CAD/USD exchange rate all in one 
option at a premium less than if the two were purchased separately. The project was 
brought on due to the fact market premiums for options on cattle futures and CAD/USD 
exchange rates were higher than the real market value of the options. Therefore the COPP 
allowed producers finishing cattle to hedge their risk at a reduced premium (Karantininis, 
McNinch, and Brown, 1997). 
 
 
 18
2.6 Option valuation 
Means of valuing option premiums include the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula and Monte Carlo simulation. In 1973 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes 
discovered a major breakthrough in the valuation of options. Their formula can be used to 
price European call and put options on non-dividend paying stocks. The basic premise 
behind the option pricing formula is that a risk-less portfolio can be set up from an 
appropriate amount of stock and options. The gain/loss in the stock exactly offsets the 
gain/loss in the option resulting in the value of the portfolio over a short period of time 
being known with certainty. The mathematical-economic model can be used to price 
options on futures contracts as well as options on physical commodities. The main 
difference being futures contracts do not pay dividends while stocks can pay dividends 
(Hull, 2002). 
Through adjusting the original model for pricing European options on non-
dividend paying stock, the formula can be used to cover European options on a stock 
paying a known continuous dividend yield. The formula can also be adjusted to value 
foreign currency, due to the fact it is analogous of a stock paying a known dividend yield. 
Owners of foreign currency receive a risk free interest rate on their money, which in this 
case is equal to the dividend yield (Hull, 2002).  
The assumptions made by Black and Scholes when they first developed their 
option pricing formula include (Hull, 1991): 
  
1. Stock price behavior is lognormal 
 2. No transaction costs or taxes, securities are perfectly divisible 
 3. No dividends on the stock during the life of the option    
 4. No arbitrage opportunities 
 5. Security trading is continuous 
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 6. Investors can borrow or lend at the same risk-free rate of interest 
 7. Short-term risk-free rate of interest is constant  
 
These assumptions allowed Black and Scholes to develop a formula to value 
options. Over time some of these assumptions have been relaxed. Such as permitting the 
rate of interest and volatility to be functions of time and allowing dividends to be taken 
into account (Hull, 1991). When developing an option pricing model assumptions must 
be made involving price movements over time. The most common assumption is that 
prices follow a random walk3, implying that prices at any future time follow a lognormal 
distribution. Lognormally distributed variables are restricted to being positive, with a 
skewed distribution, unlike the symmetrical normal distribution (Hull, 1991). 
A second, more general method to value options is through Monte Carlo 
simulation. Monte Carlo simulation charts numerous courses for exchange rates to 
follow. From this distribution of exchange rates the expected payoff distribution is 
determined which is then discounted at the risk free rate. The flexibility of Monte Carlo 
to incorporate alternative assumptions about price movements and the nature of the 
contracts, allows it to examine a wider range of possibilities relative to the highly 
structured Black Scholes formulation (Hull, 2002). 
In this thesis valuing option premiums and consequent payoffs will be pursed by 
way of Monte Carlo simulation allowing for the direct measurement of deficit 
probabilities. This methodology also aids in modeling compatibility considering wheat 
prices and exchange rates will also be simulated with Monte Carlo (Hull, 2002). 
 
                                                 
3 Random walk implies that proportional changes in prices over a short period of time are normally 
distributed. The process is also known as geometric Brownian motion (Hull, 1991). 
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2.7 Forward hedging 
Forward contracts are a third means with which hedging can be facilitated. A 
forward contract is less flexible than futures or option markets in that it calls for the 
purchase or sale of an asset at a certain time for a specific price. Forward contracts are 
not traded on an exchange; therefore they can not be traded to a third party in order to 
close out a position like futures contracts. Forward contracts do not have to conform to 
the specification of an exchange; therefore they can be customized to meet the needs of 
the parties. Forward contracts are also not marked to market like futures contracts. The 
contracts are settled at the delivery date, at which delivery or final cash settlement takes 
place (Hull, 1991).  
 
2.8 Commodity risk 
Wheat contracts from the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX) are the closest 
substitute for CWRS wheat sold by the CWB. Figure 2.1 shows the volume of MGEX 
spring wheat futures and options volume. The total number of 5000 bushel contracts in 
August of 2008 was 152,005 which equates to 20.684 million tonnes with an open 
interest of 36,327 contracts, which is just over 4.94 million tonnes. This volume of open 
interest in the futures is small compared to the size of the typical CWB CWRS pool 
account of 12 million tonnes (CWB4, 2006). The amount of tonnes the CWB would need 
to hedge may cause distortions and artificial price movements due to the number of 
contracts needed to properly execute the hedge.  
Figure 2.1 also depicts the options volume for the MGEX. In the month of August 
2008 the number of contracts trading hands was 2326 representing 316,514 tonnes with 
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an open interest of 4703 representing 639,968 tonnes. The CWB would need much more 
liquidity in the MGEX wheat options market to execute an efficient call hedge.   
 
Figure 2.1 - MGEX futures and options volume 
Source: Minneapolis Grain Exchange website www.mgex.com. Accessed Dec 1, 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts the production of wheat by class in the US. In the third column 
the estimated production for hard spring wheat is 449,000,000 bushels which is just over 
12.2 million tonnes. In the study the expected sales of wheat are 12 million tonnes 
resulting in the two being relatively close. Spring wheat in the US accounts for roughly 
21% of estimated total wheat production in 2007/08. 
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Figure 2.2 – US wheat production by class 
 
Source: USDA: World Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimates, November 10, 2008. www.usda.com. 
Accessed Dec 1, 2008. 
 
Given the relative size of the MGEX wheat options market finding traded put 
options with a strike price near the initial payment will not be plausible in most years. 
This would make it very difficult for the CWB to adhere to a consistent options hedge of 
the initial payment. Shorting futures contracts is another alternative with a similar 
problem of liquidity. Shorting sizeable amounts of futures contracts could move the 
market, reducing the effectiveness of efficient price discovery and effective hedging. 
Further contributing to the inadequacy of the short hedge is the brokerage fees and basis 
risk which can result in an ineffective hedge. For the above reasons hedging the 
commodity risk within the initial payment will not be able to be hedged away in an 
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efficient and consistent manner. Therefore the attention of this study will focus on 
strategies to mitigate the currency risk within the initial payment that being and increase 
of the CAD vis-à-vis the USD. 
 
2.9 Currency risk 
Foreign exchange risk is present in the initial payment due to the fact wheat sales 
are predominantly paid for in USD (Unterschultz and Novak, 1997). The risk of the CAD 
increasing is the risk the CWB faces when considering currency hedging. Increases in the 
CAD, essentially result in lower selling prices for wheat due to losses when USD are 
converted to CAD. Canadian wheat competes with US wheat in the world market, thus 
when the CAD rises against the USD, the CWB is forced to reduce its price to compete 
with US wheat. The CWB estimates that the rise in the CAD in 2002/03 equated to a 
$12.25 per tonne decrease in the final pool return for wheat. This loss in value across a 
pool size of slightly less than 8.7 million tones, results in an estimated loss of $106 
million. Given that the total wheat pool account deficit in 2002/03 was $85.4 million 
strongly suggests a need to protect the pool accounts from increases in the CAD (CWB1, 
2003). 
Currently the CWB pursues a forward currency hedge of ninety days to secure the 
exchange of USD for CAD at specified exchange rates. This hedging strategy is used to 
lock in the CAD value of a sale during the typical ninety day period between when grain 
is sold and when grain is delivered and payment is received. For the wheat pool account a 
specific amount of USD is converted to CAD via a forward contract. This allows the 
CWB to achieve the average exchange rate throughout the year based on when sales are 
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made versus when payment is received. Rather than hedging the foreign exchange risk of 
each sale, a specific amount of USD is converted to CAD each business day to achieve an 
average exchange rate for wheat sales. For the wheat pool account a specific amount of 
USD is converted to CAD via a forward contract. This ninety day exchange rate strategy 
however does not protect the pool from persistent longer term increases in the CAD/USD 
exchange rate when the initial payment is set. 
In theory it is possible to protect the initial payment against adverse exchange rate 
increases during the crop year by hedging for longer periods of time. Purchasing CAD 
futures contracts will allow revenue to be generated when the CAD rises vis-à-vis the 
USD, offsetting the reduced amount of CAD that will be received when USD are 
converted into CAD after wheat sales are made. A long futures hedge essentially protects 
the CAD/USD exchange rate when the hedge is placed; ensuring the CAD value of the 
initial payment is protected. A long CAD futures hedge will require a margin account and 
carries with it the possibility of untimely margin calls in the event of abrupt devaluation.  
A call option could also insulate the CWB from a rise in the CAD by effectively 
establishing a ceiling on the CAD/USD exchange rate. A call option is an option to buy 
the CAD at a certain exchange rate. When the CAD appreciates the option takes on value 
because the option owner can exercise the call, essentially buying CAD at a lower price 
and sell the dollars for more USD after the appreciation of the CAD vis-à-vis the USD. 
Option contracts can be purchased from an exchange such as the Chicago Mercantile 
exchange (CME) or Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), however lack of traded 
contracts at the desired strike prices and liquidity concerns can prevent a proper hedge to 
be placed. Figure 2.3 is taken from the CME website showing the volume of call options 
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for November of this year. It can be seen that the volume of call options is not liquid 
enough to pursue the highly specialized strategy of hedging the initial payment for the 
CWB. 
 “Of the $3.98 trillion daily global turnover, trading in London accounted for 
around $1.36 trillion, or 34.1% of the total, making London by far the global center for 
foreign exchange. In second and third places respectively, trading in New York 
accounted for 16.6%, and Tokyo accounted for 6.0%. In addition to "traditional" 
turnover, $2.1 trillion was traded in derivatives. Exchange-traded forex futures contracts 
were introduced in 1972 at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and are actively traded 
relative to most other futures contracts. Forex futures volume has grown rapidly in recent 
years, and accounts for about 7% of the total foreign exchange market volume, or $280 
billion per day in futures trading, according to The Wall Street Journal Europe (5/5/06, p. 
20) Wikapedia Foreign Exchange Markets”  
 
Figure 2.3 – CME call option volume  
 
Source: CWE website. www.cme.com. Accessed November 3, 2008. 
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The CWB could investigate the possibility of a call option using an "over the 
counter" exchange (OTC). An OTC contract is usually between two financial institutions 
or a financial institution and a corporate client. An advantage of OTC exchange is that the 
strike price and delivery date can be customized to meet the exact needs of the hedging 
party. However using this alternative is more costly than regular option markets due to 
the fact the financial institution writing the option commands a profit and incurs extra 
costs from conducting its own hedging activities to mitigate risks from writing contracts 
(Blank, Carter, and Schmiesing, 1991). 
 
2.10 Monte Carlo Simulation   
The cost and effects of financial instruments are often evaluated using a Monte 
Carlo analysis. Simulation of a stochastic process using a Monte Carlo approach is a 
procedure for sampling random outcomes for the process. A path for the asset price can 
be simulated by sampling the price change in each period from a lognormal distribution. 
While conditional probabilities and resulting values can sometimes be derived 
analytically if the problem is straightforward and enough assumptions are made, this is 
not feasible for many realistic situations. Fortunately, outcome and values can be easily 
derived numerically from Monte Carlo simulations for much more complex assumptions.  
The Monte Carlo approach uses random number generators to simulate thousands 
of equally likely futures involving the price paths for a large number of prices. For each 
random future it is possible to calculate the implications for sales, call value etc. By 
averaging over all of the equally likely futures it is possible to calculate expected values, 
expected payouts etc. Thus Monte Carlo simulation is a very powerful tool for calculating 
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economic rewards in the presence of random price movements. Fortunately, this 
technique has become very fast and affordable with the advent of the PC and software to 
run the simulations.  
A Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modeling will be employed in this study 
allowing for the various call option strategies to be analyzed. The model will be 
simulated in Microsoft Excel utilizing the program @Risk, which is a Microsoft Excel 
“add in” program. @Risk, pronounced "at risk", allows for the definition of random 
variables in an Excel worksheet as probability distributions. The software makes random 
draws from probability distributions of each exogenous variable included in the model, 
(in our case exchange rate and wheat price movements) and can calculate expected values 
and other moments of these distributions etc.  Importantly, all cells that are dependant on 
random variables also become random variables within the spreadsheet. The @Risk 
program calculates and reports moments from these dependant random variables. The 
ability to specify payoffs as a function of the random exogenous variables allows for a 
broad spectrum of potential outcomes to be considered to accurately evaluate the risk and 
uncertainty of hedging alternatives (@Risk, 2004).  
The power of @Risk is that this sampling procedure is conducted in a fast and 
efficient manner resulting in a distribution for each uncertain variable within the model 
(Hull, 2002). Moreover the Excel model lays out various sales and hedging scenarios and 
utilizes @Risk to simulate the model repeatedly so inputs and outputs can be represented 
by distributions instead of single values. This allows for probabilities to be evaluated and 
is at the core of evaluating call option deficit mitigation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Conceptual framework for estimating the costs and impacts of currency hedging 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the wheat pool account deficit concerns for the CWB and 
methods of mitigating the probability of a deficit by using call option contracts. Chapter 
three also lays out the economic framework for the stochastic simulation model that will 
be used for the analysis in chapter 4. As mentioned in chapter 2 the objective of the CWB 
in the context of this paper is to maximize the expected pool return at each initial 
payment level for any given level of risk. In order to quantify the effect each option 
strategy has, the model is run at numerous initial payment levels and option strike prices. 
In each scenario the probability of a deficit is recorded and compared to an un-hedged 
scenario to identify how much deficit reduction is attributed to each strategy. Each option 
strategy also has a premium attributed to it which allows the decision maker to examine 
the trade off between deficit mitigation and option outlays. This trade off between option 
outlays and deficit reductions is at the heart of determining which strategy is worth 
pursuing for the CWB to maximize the expected wheat pool account.  
Policy implications surrounding the initial payment revolve around deficit 
probabilities / WTO implications, and political support from prairie farmers. The higher 
the CWB sets the initial payment the higher the probability the CWB has of a pool 
account deficit. CWB pool account deficits attract a great deal of media coverage and 
further increase anti-State Trading Enterprise (STE) advocates claim that the CWB is a 
major contributor to market distortions. Conversely the higher the CWB sets the initial 
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payment the more upfront money prairie farmers receive and consequent political support 
for the CWB continuing as a single desk seller.  
The CWB objective function is to maximize the expected pool return at each 
initial payment level and option strategy subject to the probability of a deficit being lower 
than a predetermined probability. In a more detailed explanation the expected value of the 
pool is equal to the Canadian dollar value of wheat sales plus the call option payoff minus 
the call option premium. This is subject to the probability the expected value of the pool 
being less than the initial payment level is not lower than the predetermined allowable 
percentage chance of a pool account deficit.  
 
The CWB objective function can be expressed in the following equation:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ikikikikMax λαβυ −Τ+Β=Α                                                           (3.1) 
 
Subject to: 
 
 P ( )( ) ευ <<Α diik  
 
Where: 
 
 ( )ikΑυ  = Expected value of pool 
 ( )ikΒβ  = Canadian dollar sale value of wheat 
 ( )ikΤα  = Call option payoff 
 ikλ = Call option premium 
 di = Initial payment value of pool 
 ε = Allowable probability of pool account deficit 
 i = Initial payment level  
 k = Call option strike prices  
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Overall a strategy which leads to the examination of a central playing ground 
between initial payment levels and option outlays will allow the CWB to effectively 
mitigate the impact of a rising CAD. This will satisfy prairie farmers because they are 
receiving as high as possible up front money from the initial payment. This also serves to 
subdue WTO anti-STE proponents by lowering the percentage chance of a CWB deficit 
and further concessions required by WTO member countries. The chart below is useful to 
conceptually see the trade off between each possible strategy. 
 
Table 3.1 – Matrix of possible option premiums and deficit probabilities 
 Option premium   % Deficit 
IP level 1 1.05 1.1  1 1.05 1.1 un-hedged 
60% Cost 1 Cost 2 Cost 3  Deficit 1 Deficit 2 Deficit 3 Deficit 4 
65% Cost 4 Cost 5 Cost 6  Deficit 5 Deficit 6 Deficit 7 Deficit 8 
70% Cost 7 Cost 8 Cost 9  Deficit 9 Deficit 10 Deficit 11 Deficit 12 
75% Cost 10 Cost 11 Cost 12  Deficit 13 Deficit 14 Deficit 15 Deficit 16 
80% Cost 13 Cost 14 Cost 15  Deficit 17 Deficit 18 Deficit 19 Deficit 20 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
 
After analyzing table 3.1 it can be seen there are a number of possible policies to 
consider. As was mentioned before, higher initial payments lead to increased political 
support from farmers due to increased up front money. This however has an increased 
probability of a deficit and WTO repercussions. Hedging the CAD with options in-the-
money will require larger premiums than similar options slightly out-of-the-money or at-
the-money. In the economic framework of this paper option outlays are assumed to be 
equal to option payoffs. This may not be representative of practical applications and one 
would have to gauge how much deficit is actually reduced per actual dollar spent on 
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hedging. If this was not the case option premiums over time would become staggering 
and this initial payment hedging strategy would quickly lose support.     
Another possible strategy is to establish a maximum probability for the pool 
account deficit and then work backwards to determine the most effective strategy. Under 
this scenario table 3.1 can be referenced to determine the highest initial payment level 
without going over the maximum probability of a deficit. It can also be determined 
whether or not hedging the initial payment can increase the initial payment level without 
going over the maximum probability of a deficit. Implications of this strategy could result 
in greater support from prairie farmers because they know the CWB is continually 
finding ways to pay them more money upfront. This also could have the effect of 
mitigating WTO concessions due to the fact the CWB has a plan in place to help ensure 
deficits are minimized.  
Assuming correct hedging practices are employed the CWB could have profits 
associated with the call option hedge. If this happened these funds could be put away in a 
contingency fund or used for future premiums. The proceeds could also be distributed to 
producers which could further increase CWB support. Conversely the hedge could result 
in zero profits. In this scenario the premium paid is essentially the trade off for a 
reduction in the probability of a deficit. Implications could be uncertainty surrounding the 
hedging cost because the CWB never needed protection from a rising CAD. It could 
potentially be difficult to justify to prairie farmers that the premium is a trade off for risk 
reduction and over time has the potential to mitigate a potential deficit.  
 
 
 
 32
3.2 Estimating the cost of the options purchased in each scenario 
   
An important factor in the decision to purchase options to reduce the chance of a 
pool account deficit is the cost of the options. It is also important that the estimated 
premiums for options are consistent with the stochastic processes involved and the 
purchase decisions for each scenario examined.  The ability to use historical data to 
calculate these premiums is limited to situations seen in the past and is of very little use. 
Fortunately the methodology for valuing options is well established in the literature and 
is extensively used as a tool for those using them in the market place. 
The standard assumption in the finance literature is that options premiums should 
reflect a risk free interest rate. Risk neutral valuation is one of the most important 
assumptions for the analysis of derivatives. In a risk neutral world the expected return on 
all assets is the risk free rate of interest. This is due to the fact investors do not require 
premiums for taking risks. In a risk neutral world there are no transaction costs involved 
due to the fact premiums are not required for taking on risk. This means the present value 
of any cash flow is calculated by discounting the expected value by the risk free rate 
(Hull, 2002).  
By including options as a small portion of a larger portfolio, investors can offset 
the associated risk of writing the option. Given a risk free rate, investors writing an 
option earn a premium, which reflects the expected payout of the option. While this 
assumption of perfect and risk free arbitrage is very strong, one could argue that if returns 
above the risk free rate were available, investors could arbitrage this advantage away. A 
more conservative assumption to make is that the options premium should reflect 
expected payouts, plus transactions costs plus a small risk premium. With this view of the 
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world, premiums that reflect expected payouts would represent the lower bound of what 
the market would demand for premiums. Given the practical difficulty in estimating the 
true market premiums the risk free zero transaction premiums will be used in the 
analysis, this is a lower bound for actual hedging costs.  
 The calculation of expected payouts as an estimate of premium cost is straight 
forward using the @Risk Monte Carlo simulation. In a risk neutral world the expected 
payoff from an option calculated by Monte Carlo simulation is also the expected cost. 
Therefore the cost of each option strategy is exactly equal to the expected payoff, the 
only difference being the payoff is a distribution and the cost is a single value. The Monte 
Carlo simulation is used to value option premiums by first simulating a course for 
exchange rates in a risk neutral world, calculating the expected options payoff, and 
discounting the payoff at the risk free rate. This procedure is carried out many times 
resulting in a random payoff distribution with the mean representing the expected payoff. 
Monte Carlo is also used to simulate wheat prices guaranteeing model compatibility 
(Hull, 2002). 
 
3.3 Calculating wheat pool account deficits 
In the absence of purchasing exchange rate options, a deficit will occur in the pool 
account when the value of sales in CAD net of all other costs is less than the initial 
payment. The stochastic distribution of sales revenue and pool account deficits can be 
derived in the @Risk Monte Carlo simulation of wheat prices and exchange rate 
movements. For each of the 10,000 equally likely futures, sales revenues and pool 
account balances are calculated. The proportion of these futures where a deficit occurs is 
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the probability of deficit. The average of the pool deficits represents the expected value 
of deficit.  
The procedure is only slightly more complex when the exchange rates are hedged 
through the purchase of call options. In this case the distribution of the option payoff 
minus the premium, added to the distribution of wheat sales results in reduced 
probabilities of lower values i.e. deficits, regardless of the mean of the payoff and 
premium being the same (Hull, 2002). This can be represented by the following equation: 
 
CAD Sales (NH) + Call payoff – Call premium = CAD Sales (H)                   (3.2) 
 
Equation 3.2 depicts the intuition behind determining the deficit mitigating effects 
of call option hedging. In the above formula CAD Sales (NH) represents total CAD sales 
of wheat with no hedging, and CAD Sales (H) represents wheat sales after the gains or 
losses of hedging are included. Deficit probabilities are calculated before and after CAD 
hedging, the difference being the risk reduction gains or losses of CAD call option 
hedging.  
 To gain a visual understanding of how deficit probabilities are calculated figure 
3.1 depicts CAD wheat sales with and without call option hedging.  
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Figure 3.1 – CAD wheat sales distribution with hedging (H) and no hedging (NH) 
 
 
The probability of a deficit with no hedging is A + B, and with hedging it is only 
B. It should be noted that every initial payment level corresponds to a different initial 
payment value and therefore deficit probability. Also there are various call option 
strategies pursued all resulting in varying degrees of reduction in the probability of a 
deficit. Therefore the distributions represented in figure 3.1 are only for representation 
purposes to illustrate the gains or losses from options hedging.  
It should be noted that given the assumptions of a risk neutral world the larger the 
payoff/premium the larger the deficit reduction. However outcomes are stochastic and 
therefore payoffs and premiums will not equate from year to year but will tend to do so 
on average.  Moreover, this could result in the CWB forfeiting large option premiums, 
expecting a payoff of equal value, only for the CAD to decrease vis-à-vis the USD and 
render the call option worthless. With this said the decision maker must determine a 
benchmark deficit probability at each initial payment level and feasible premium outlay 
to use as insurance against a rise in the CAD. Chapter four contains simulation results 
A 
B 
IP Value 
CAD wheat sales (NH) 
CAD wheat sales (H) 
Realized pool returns 
Probability 
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which allow for insight into benchmark deficit probabilities at each initial payment level 
and risk/premium analysis of each call option strategy. 
 
3.4 Model components 
The model includes a number of uncertain inputs and variables. Variables whose 
values have been fixed from the outset include the amount of wheat sold, initial currency 
exchange rate, initial USD wheat price, timing of call option purchases and the CWB 
August PRO. The length of the crop year is also set from August 1 to July 31 with all 
sales and distributions happening in this time frame4.  
Certain variables in the model are of significant policy importance. These include 
the initial payment value as a percentage of the August PRO and the exercise price of the 
call option relative to the spot price. These policy variables will be evaluated at a range of 
levels allowing for numerous scenario combinations to arise. The CWB will be most 
interested in which combination mitigates the chance of a deficit while incurring the 
minimum expenditure to implement.  
 
3.5 Inputs 
The study sources wheat volatility information from the June 2008 FAO food 
outlook. In this report it is noted that monthly implied volatility has dramatically 
increased in recent years increasing the risk faced by the CWB when setting initial 
payment levels. Implied volatility refers to how much the market expects the price of 
wheat to move in the future. Implied volatility is seen to be more responsive than 
                                                 
4 The CWB may begin sales earlier than August and beyond July 31 however the amounts in these periods 
were omitted to simplify modeling. 
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historical volatility and therefore is more responsive to current market conditions. 
Because implied volatility cannot be observed it has to be inferred from the price of 
derivatives such as call options. This information is used to determine an appropriate 
monthly implied volatility for wheat (FAO, 2008).  
To determine CAD/USD exchange rate volatility analysis done by CIBC World 
Markets on the implied volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate is analyzed. In the 
analysis it is found that the current implied volatility has been steadily increasing in past 
months increasing the risk faced by the CWB when establishing initial price levels and 
determining strike prices for possible call option hedging (CIBC, 2008).  
Both inputs are estimated using Monte Carlo simulation and are simulated for the 
year starting August 1 and ending July 31. This results in each input having a distribution 
of possible outcomes. Generating wheat and exchange rate distributions is at the core of 
determining the probability of a deficit, and hence the amount of deficit reduction 
achieved by each option strategy.   
 
3.6 Variables 
 The excel model contains a number of variables whose values have been 
predetermined. For ease of computation each month of the crop year is allocated a sale of 
one million tonnes. Intuitively it can be seen that the greatest volatility in exchange rates 
and wheat prices exist further out in the crop year. Therefore if the crop year is extended 
past twelve months the increase in uncertainty will result in greater probabilities of 
deficits. The values can be adjusted to reflect any particular sales pattern but for 
modeling purposes, sales are assumed to be evenly distributed and totaling twelve million 
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tonnes. The initial USD wheat price is set at $350 per tonne, combined with an initial 
exchange rate of 1 CAD/USD results in the August PRO being $350 Canadian per tonne. 
Both initial values can be adjusted to reflect current market conditions at the start of the 
crop year. However the values chosen here are an attempt to replicate current conditions 
taking into consideration historical values and future expectations.  
 The timing of call option purchases plays a role in premium calculations in that 
the longer the time to expiry the greater the uncertainty and therefore cost. It is assumed 
that European OTC contracts are purchased at the outset of the year covering the initial 
payment value in question. As far as exchange traded options, the CME or PHLX does 
not offer currency option trading every month and may not have enough liquidity to 
allow the CWB to carry out the option strategy under consideration. Therefore for ease of 
modeling it is assumed that options are purchased at the outset of the crop year from an 
over the counter (OTC) financial institution. Thus at the expiry date of the call options on 
the CAD contracts will either be in-the-money at which time the CWB will sell them to 
offset increases in the CAD or worthless meaning the CAD/USD exchange rate had 
decreased. This procedure of purchasing call options and redeeming them at time of 
expiry will be carried out between the CWB and OTC financial institution. It assumes no 
transaction costs or brokerage fees. 
 
3.7 Policy variables 
The model contains two variables which bare significant policy implications. First 
is the initial payment as a percentage of the August PRO. The initial payment is the first 
money farmers receive for their wheat. Logically the greater the price the more money 
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farmers have to pay bills and arguably corresponds to greater political support for the 
CWB. Bare in mind the higher the initial payment as a percentage of the current price the 
greater the probability wheat sales could fall below the initial payment value. The model 
will be simulated at varying levels to determine how high the initial payment can be set 
without undertaking unnecessary amounts of deficit risk.  
 
Figure 3.2 - Initial payment levels  
 
 
In figure 3.2 the vertical line A represents a low initial payment with a low deficit 
probability of A1. The vertical line B represents a high initial payment with a higher 
probability of a deficit equal to A1 + B1. Higher initial payments allow for increased 
upfront money to farmers; however they also carry with them an increased risk of a 
deficit if commodity prices decline or exchange rates suddenly change. To hedge the 
CAD risk inherent in initial payment A and B long call option contracts will be 
purchased. Due to the higher value inherent with initial payment B more contracts are 
needed which result in an increased cost for the hedge. Higher costs lose popularity when 
A1 
B 1 
A CAD wheat sales B 
Probability 
 
Realized pool returns 
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the hedge is not profitable because producers start thinking the hedge is unnecessary. 
However having the hedge in place reduces the risk of a deficit over the longer term and 
ultimately provides increased protection from a pool account deficit and consequent 
repercussions.   
The second parameter is the call exercise price relative to the initial exchange 
rate. At the outset of the crop year the exchange rate is set at 1 CAD/USD. It can however 
be adjusted to represent current market conditions and expectations. It is the goal of this 
study to mitigate exchange rate risk, namely ensure that losses in wheat sales due to 
exchange rates are minimized to avoid wheat pool account deficits. This will be 
attempted by simulating the model with strike prices at-the-money and out-of-the-money 
to determine how much risk can be eliminated and at what cost. Analyzing varying 
option strike prices is useful due to the fact the greater the contract strike price is out-of-
the-money the lower the premium. In theory the higher the risk reduction strategy sought 
the higher the cost incurred. This also holds true in this scenario as the closer the option 
strike prices are to the current exchange rate the greater the premium to obtain them. This 
stems from the fact that options closer to being in-the-money have a higher chance of 
paying off and therefore premiums to purchase them are higher. The CWB will have to 
weigh approximate option outlays to corresponding reductions in the probability of a 
deficit and budget accordingly.   
 
 
 
 
 41
CHAPTER FOUR 
 The Simulation Model  
 
4.1 Model overview 
The goal of the model is to calculate the risk reducing effects of applying call 
option hedging to the CAD. This is an attempt to reduce the negative effects of a rise in 
the CAD compared to the USD. The model assumes global wheat prices are denominated 
in U.S. currency and are highly correlated to wheat prices quoted on the Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange (MGEX). Currency risk is therefore present when the CWB has to price 
sales in USD and convert sales money back to Canadian dollars. Hence an increase in the 
CAD vis-à-vis the USD results in a reduction in the CAD selling price. To mitigate 
currency risk the model analyzes adjusting the initial payment as a percentage of the 
August PRO and analyzing various call option strike prices. The initial payment value for 
the year is subsequently the number of tonnes of wheat sold multiplied by the initial 
payment per tonne.  
 
4.2 Model structure 
The two stochastic exogenous variables in the model are wheat prices and the 
CAD/USD exchange rate. In chapter three a brief overview of the theory behind Monte 
Carlo simulation was given. Below is a more in-depth discussion of the formulas and 
assumptions utilized in order to simulate input values.   
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Monte Carlo simulation assumes exchange rates and wheat price behavior follow 
a geometric Brownian motion pattern5. In this process the return to the holder of an asset 
under any period of time is normally distributed. Returns between any two intervals are 
therefore independent. Brownian motion has been used in physics to describe the 
movement of a particle after it has been exposed to number of small molecular shocks 
(Hull, 2002). To illustrate geometric Brownian motion consider figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Graph of two CAD/USD exchange rate paths 
 
The equation expressing the behavior of wheat prices and exchange rates is identified by: 
 
∂ S t
S t
= μ ∂ t + σ ∂ z                                                        (4.1) 
 
Where µ is the per period growth rate and σ  is the one period coefficient of 
variation in prices and ∂z. In the above equation the natural logarithm of wheat prices and 
                                                 
5 Geometric Brownian motion is equivalent and interchangeable with the term random walk (Hull, 1991). 
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exchange rates lnS follows a Wiener process represented by z∂ . A Wiener process is a 
stochastic process with a mean change of zero and variance of one per period. More 
formally the Wiener process z∂ follows two main properties: 
 
1) A change zΔ during a small interval of time tΔ  is expressed tz Δ=Δ ε , where 
ε  is a random draw from a standard normal distribution, with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. 
2)  The values zΔ  for any two different small time intervals represented by tΔ  
are independent of one another (Hull, 2002). 
 
The change in S in a small interval of time tΔ  is equal to: 
 
lnS(t + Δt) = ln S(t) + (μ −σ 2 /2)Δt +σε Δt                       (4.2) 
 
This implies that the logarithm of price or exchange rate takes a random walk, where the 
log of price one period in the future, lnS(t + Δt), is equal the log of price in the current 
period, lnS(t), plus a deterministic time trend (μ −σ 2 /2), plus σε  a normal random 
variable with mean zero and a variance of σ 2.  
This is equivalent to equation 4.3: 
))2/( 2)()( ttetSttS Δ+Δ−=Δ+ σεσμ                    (4.3) 
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In the equation 4.3 St is the price of wheat and exchange rate at time t, μ  denotes 
the expected return6, andσ is the standard deviation. The left hand side of the equation 
)( ttS Δ+  is the expected value after a change in time tΔ . As was mentioned above the 
stochastic part of the equation is represented byε , which is a random draw from a normal 
distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to one (Hull, 2002). In order 
to properly capture the risk in exchange rates and wheat prices over a twelve month 
period equation 4.3 is slightly modified to capture the cumulative volatility from month 
to month as shown in equation 4.4 below.  
 
S ( t + 2) = S ( t + 1)e (μ−σ 2 / 2 )+σε = S ( t)e 2(μ−σ 2 / 2 )+σε 1 +σε 2                               
               (4.4) 
 In equation 4.4 the numbers one through twelve represent the months August 
through July. For example when replicating wheat prices or exchange rates for November 
it would require four draws from a standard normal distribution represented by equation 
4.5. 
 ∑
=
4
1i
iε = 1ε (Aug) + 2ε (Sept) + 3ε (Oct) + 4ε (Nov)       (4.5) 
 
In the equation 4.2 ln S is normally distributed ensuring S (t + )tΔ in equation 4.3 
has a lognormal7 distribution. A variable that is lognormal in distribution has a value 
                                                 
6μ equals the risk free interest rate in a risk neutral world. If S represents wheat prices r=μ ; for 
exchange rates frr −=μ , where r is the domestic rate, and fr is the foreign risk-free rate (Hull, 2002). 
7 A random variable x is lognormal if x = ye , where y is normally distributed. Moreover, a random variable 
is lognormal if its natural logarithm is normally distributed (Hull, 2002). 
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between zero and infinity, resulting in a skewed distribution to the right hand side. 
Lognormality is essential for forecasting wheat prices and exchange rates due to the 
requirement of non-negative values (Hull, 2002). 
  Drift in mean values in both inputs from month to month is represented 
by,
te Δ− )2/(
2σμ
 which is the expected return minus half the variance multiplied by 
the change in time raised to the power of "e". The drift is negligible resulting in a near 
constant mean with the volatility, i.e. standard deviation, increasing by the square root of 
time. Modeling this way reflects the fact the mean will stay fairly constant; however the 
volatility increases with each successive month in the crop year. Intuitively it can be seen 
that later on in the crop year is when there exists the greatest uncertainty and consequent 
chance of a deficit (Hull, 2002).  
 
4.3 Data and model parameters 
 As was mentioned in section 4.1 the goal of the model is to mitigate currency risk 
inherent in wheat sales for the CWB. First USD wheat prices and CAD/USD exchange 
rates are determined by Monte Carlo simulation creating a probability distribution for 
each input. The USD wheat price distribution is divided by the exchange rate distribution 
resulting in a CAD wheat price distribution. The sales price distribution is multiplied by 
the number of tonnes of wheat sold resulting in a distribution for total CAD wheat sales. 
In this scenario exchange rate risk is fully present each time USD wheat prices are 
converted to Canadian currency.  
  To calculate the call option value the CAD/USD exchange rate distribution is 
analyzed. Exchange rates are determined through Monte Carlo simulation which assumes 
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a risk-neutral state. The option value is calculated by taking the payoff from each call 
option being in-the-money, taking the mean, and discounting the value at the risk free 
rate. The option payoff is determined by implementing a logical test into the model 
spreadsheet. The test states that if a value from the exchange rate input distribution is 
greater then the option strike price it is subtracted from the strike price to get the payoff. 
If the value from the distribution is not greater than the strike price the test simply 
concludes with the payoff being zero, meaning that particular path for exchange rates did 
not end up in-the-money. This creates a payoff distribution consisting of option profits 
from exchange rates being above the strike price and values of zero if exchange rates fall 
below the strike price. The option payoff mean is the expected payoff evaluated at a 
specific call option strike price. Evaluating the payoff over various numbers of iterations 
will ultimately yield different payoffs. To be as accurate as possible this study evaluates 
the model over ten thousand iterations ensuring all possible outcomes are properly 
represented.    
 To better understand how the model exactly works consider the flow chart below 
which explains in detail each step of the process to generate wheat pool account deficit 
probabilities. 
 
 
 47
4.4 Monte Carlo Simulation flow chart 
 
1. Set starting values 
 
- Initial wheat price as a percentage of the PRO 
- Initial CAD/USD exchange rate 
- Call option strike price 
- Volatility of wheat prices and CAD/USD exchange rates 
- Tonnes of wheat sold per month 
- Discount rate of USD and CAD 
2. Simulate USD wheat prices and CAD/USD exchange rates for each month 
using the below formula 
))2/(
1
2
)()(
tt
T
i
i
etSttS
Δ∑+Δ−
==Δ+ εσσμ  
 
The stochastic part of the equation is represented by iε , which is a random draw from a 
normal distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to one. The model 
calculates 10,000 draws for each value of iε . Both exchange rates and wheat prices will 
have twelve 10,000 draws for each value of iε , one for each month of the crop year. 
3. Calculate CAD wheat prices 
 
Calculate the CAD wheat price distribution by dividing the distribution of USD wheat 
prices generated in step 2 by the distribution of CAD/USD exchange rates generated in step 
2 for each month of the crop year. This is where the increase in the CAD reduces the final 
wheat selling price for the CWB. 
4. Calculate the call option payoff from the CAD/USD exchange rate 
distribution for each month in the crop year 
 
For example in figure 4.2 assume the call option strike price is 1.05 CAD/USD or 1.05 USD 
= 1 CAD. Anytime the CAD/USD is above 1.05 CAD/USD the option will generate a 
payoff meaning the CAD increased versus the USD i.e. assume 1 random draw was 1.06 
CAD/USD the payoff would be (1.06-1.05 = 0.01), this payoff is multiplied by the initial 
payment value to get the call value.  
 
i.e. (Call payoff/month) * 70% * ($350/t) * (1M tonnes/month) = call value per month  
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Figure 4.2 - Call option payoff 
 
Probability 
 
                                   Realized pool returns 
 
 
1.05 CAD/USD 
Call payoff 
1 CAD/USD 
5. Generate the CAD un-hedged wheat sales distribution for each month  
 
This is done by multiplying the wheat price distribution each month by the amount of 
tonnes sold each month of the crop year 
6. Generate the CAD hedged wheat sales distribution  
 
This is calculated by adding the call option value distribution to the CAD un-hedged 
(UH) wheat sales distribution and subtracting the mean of the call option value 
distribution. The call option value mean is the premium paid at the outset of the crop 
year while the call option value distribution is the expected gains from the hedge. 
This process is done for each month of the crop year. Note that call option value, 
CAD wheat sales (UH), and CAD wheat sales hedged are probability distributions 
while the call premium is a single value. 
 
Call option value + CAD wheat sales (UH) – Call premium = CAD wheat sales hedged 
7. Determine the probability of a deficit from both the un-hedged and hedged 
CAD wheat sales distribution  
 
This is done by determining the probability of sales below the initial payment 
values. The initial payment values are generated by taking the total tonnes of grain 
sold in the crop year and multiplying it by the initial CAD selling price and again by 
the initial payment percentage under consideration. For example the initial payment 
value for 70% would be = 12M tonnes x $350/t x 70% = $2,940M. The graph below 
visually depicts how this is achieved. The deficit when no hedging of the CAD is in 
place is A + B and when hedging is pursued only B. 
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Figure 4.3 - CAD wheat sales deficit probability 
 
 
 
4.5 Simulating deficit reductions 
 The study evaluates the model with a number of base scenario values in order to 
generate benchmark probabilities of wheat pool account deficits. From this base scenario 
wheat price and exchange rate volatility are adjusted as well as the strike price for call 
option purchases.   
For ease of computation the model assumes that options will be purchased at-the-
money which is 1 CAD/USD and out-of-the-money at 1.05 and 1.1. In the base case 
scenario the call options will be purchased at 1.05 CAD/USD which is 5 percent out-of-
the money assuming initial parity of the USD and CAD. The model however has the 
capacity to evaluate deficit calculations at varying exchange rates. The initial price as a 
percentage of the August PRO is represented by 60%, 65%, 70%, 75% and 80% of the 
PRO. At each larger initial payment level more call option contracts are needed to protect 
the value of the initial payment. For use in the base scenario the initial payment as a 
A 
B 
IP Value 
CAD wheat sales (NH) 
CAD wheat sales (H) 
Realized pool returns 
Probability 
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percentage of the PRO will be 70% which previous initial payment levels have been 
approximated. 
 Overall deficit reductions are determined by evaluating the probability of a deficit 
under an un-hedged scenario and comparing it to the chance of a deficit with exchange 
rate hedging in place. Calculation of a deficit is thus the percentage chance total CAD 
wheat sales are less than the total initial payment value.  
The simulation model makes a number of assumptions regarding the data used to 
produce the results in Appendix A. In a CIBC World Markets strategy paper it is 
calculated that the implied volatility for the CAD/USD exchange rate has been increasing 
(CIBC, 2007). Figure 4.4 depicts the three month implied volatility for the CAD/USD 
exchange rate showing how it has changed over time. In order for the volatility to be 
inputted into the model the three month volatility is used to approximate a monthly 
standard deviation. A monthly standard deviation of 3% per month8 is used to generate 
the CAD/USD exchange rate probability distribution in the base scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Monthly implied volatility is determined by taking the third root of the three month implied volatility. If 
the three month volatility is 9% the one month would be, y x = 9 1/3 = 2.08%. 
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Figure 4.4 – Exchange rate implied volatility 
 
Source: CIBC World Markets: FX Trade Strategy. Data from Jun 4, 2005 – July 26, 2007.              
Accessed July 1, 2008. 
 
Wheat volatility was sourced from the Food & Agriculture Organization outlook 
paper. The paper calculates that recent wheat price volatility is at very high levels (FAO, 
2008). Figure 4.5 shows annual and monthly implied volatility. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Wheat price implied volatility 
 
Source: FAO Food Outlook - Global Market Analysis. June 2008. Accessed July 1, 2008. 
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The paper graphs annual and monthly wheat volatility depicting a sharp increase 
in volatility in the first six months of 2008. The simulation model requires monthly 
volatility which is approximated to be 10% per month in the base scenario simulation. 
This value is an approximation of current volatility in the wheat market but can be seen to 
be significantly higher depending on the exact economic factors at play. This high 
volatility also reiterates how important solid marketing and risk management strategies 
are to farmer’s welfare (FAO, 2008).  
Initial wheat prices and exchange rates are inputted in the model as single values 
and represent current market values at the time of this study. The initial wheat price in 
USD is $350/tonne and the initial exchange rate is 1 CAD/USD. These values represent 
approximate current values at the time of this study and will serve well as base scenario 
inputs into the model. It is assumed that the currency hedge is implemented at the same 
time as the initial payment in August. The model assumes that no interim or adjustment 
payments are made throughout the crop year. It is also assumed that if additional 
payments are made to the pool account, the chance of a deficit is calculated to be very 
small due to grain already sold by the CWB at higher prices. Wheat sales are assumed to 
be 1 million tonnes per month for a total of 12 million tonnes representing that the CWB 
spreads out sales throughout the crop year to obtain an average wheat selling price 
throughout the year. Table 4.1 lists out the base scenario values described above and used 
in the Monte Carlo simulation model to calculate the results. 
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Table 4.1 – Base scenario values 
Parameters Base values 
Tonnes of wheat sold per month 1,000,000
Initial wheat price $350 
Monthly standard deviation of wheat prices 10%
Initial exchange rate CAD/USD or USD=CAD 1
Monthly standard deviation of exchange rates  3%
  
Policy variables  
Percent hedge of initial payment 70%
Call option strike price CAD/USD or USD=CAD 1.05
 
4.6 Results and sensitivity analysis  
 This study evaluates the model at the base scenario settings seen in table 4.1 in 
order to establish a benchmark deficit probability. The model then simulates the initial 
payment level at 60%, 65%, 75%, and 80% of the PRO in order to capture the probability 
of a deficit across a range of initial payment levels. 
Appendix A.1 to A.4 show a detailed view of the model results in its entirety and 
will be referenced throughout the remainder of this chapter. Appendix A.1 to A.3 has 
three tables depicting the results of the simulations allowing important policy objectives 
to be determined. Appendix A.4 is a sensitivity analysis table where the volatility of 
exchange rates, volatility of wheat prices and call option strike prices are adjusted to 
determine the effect on the pool deficit. Note that all call option premiums are considered 
in the deficit probability results and therefore all costs are accounted for and deficit 
probabilities are net of call option premiums. The results of the base scenario simulation 
are captured in figure 4.6 which shows the range of deficit probabilities across the initial 
payment levels. 
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Figure 4.6 – Efficiency frontier - Base scenarios 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
 
In the above figure it can be seen that the greater the initial payment level set by 
the CWB the greater the probability of a deficit. The solid line coming down from each 
initial payment level represents the deficit when no hedging is undertaken and the dashed 
line represents the deficit when currency hedging is pursued. This comes as predicted as 
it is expected that reducing the effect of an increasing CAD would decrease the 
probability of a deficit. For example consider a 70% initial payment level, under base 
assumptions the probability of a deficit is 4.89% representing an average dollar deficit of 
($10,813,205)9 and when currency hedging is in place a 4.29% probability of a deficit for 
an average dollar deficit of ($9,538,920). In this base assumption the option premium for 
                                                 
9 The number in parenthesis represents the average dollar value of the pool account deficit. 
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this hedge is $36,243,985. This decrease in percentage chance of a deficit is attributed to 
the fact the call option takes on value whenever the CAD increases versus the USD, and 
adds to the total wheat pool return lowering the risk of a deficit. The graph also shows 
clearly that as the initial payment level is increased beyond 70% it results in 
approximately doubling and tripling the probability of a deficit. This coincides well with 
traditional initial payment levels set by the CWB which range between 60% and 70% of 
the PRO. Adjusting the initial payment level is an important policy tool for the CWB. If 
the CWB can increase the initial payment level due to the benefits of currency hedging 
without increasing a possible deficit they will win substantial political support from 
producers. This will also bode well during WTO negotiations because the CWB can now 
reduce their exposure to an increasing CAD and better manage sales revenues.   
So far only the base scenario has been evaluated in the simulation model; 
however it is interesting to see the results when the volatility of wheat and exchange rates 
are adjusted as well as the call option strike price. Figure 4.7 depicts the deficit 
probability when the wheat volatility is adjusted from 10% (standard deviation) to 5% 
and 15%. 
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Figure 4.7 - Sensitivity analysis adjusting wheat price volatility 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that when the wheat price volatility drops off to a 5% standard 
deviation per month the probability of a deficit is greatly reduced to 0.11% ($104,086) 
under a no hedge scenario and 0.02% ($19,563) when hedging is present. These numbers 
are considerably less than the base scenario and basically represent no real chance of a 
pool account deficit when wheat price volatility is low. However when the volatility is 
increased to 15% the probability of a deficit rises considerably to 12.86% ($48,200,458) 
in an un-hedged scenario and 12.33% ($46,269,643) when hedging is present. In both 
cases the call option premium is $36,243,985. Understanding how an increase in wheat 
volatility can considerably affect the chance of a deficit reiterates how important the 
initial payment level is to mitigating the chance of a deficit. For example an increase of 
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wheat price volatility to 15% has a deficit just short of setting the initial payment level to 
80% of the PRO in the base scenario.  
Currency volatility however is an important factor when considering the overall 
sales revenue equation. This can be seen in Figure 4.8 and 4.9 which represents the 
results of the simulation model when exchange rate volatility is adjusted.   
 
Figure 4.8 – Sensitivity analysis adjusting CAD/USD volatility 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
 
 Figure 4.8 takes into consideration adjusting the exchange rate volatility from 3% 
to 1.5% and up to 4.5%. This will give a better understanding of the incremental impact 
exchange rate volatility has on overall deficit probabilities. Consider the base scenario of 
3% standard deviation per month, the un-hedged probability of a deficit is 4.89% 
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($10,813,205) and the hedged deficit probability is 4.29% ($9,538,920) showing a 
positive response to the call option hedge.  
Now consider reducing the volatility to 1.5% per month. When the simulation is 
run the deficit probability drops to 4.08% ($9,551,490) un-hedged and 3.96% 
($8,874,971) when hedging is factored in. Call option premiums are $5,677,571 due to 
the low risk involved when exchange rate volatility is low. The percentage drop is small 
due to the large presence wheat price volatility plays in the big picture of wheat pool 
account deficits. 
 Figure 4.8 also takes into consideration deficit probabilities when currency 
volatility rises to 4.5% per month. In this scenario the deficit probability un-hedged is 
5.1% ($12,390,497) and 4.01% ($9,383,334) hedged, with a call premium of 
$68,360,593. In this scenario it can be seen that the spread between the un-hedged and 
hedged deficit is greater due to the increasing effects of the call option when the 
exchange rate volatility is high. This increased option benefit is also accompanied with 
higher premiums due to the volatility of exchange rates and increased chance the option 
will be in-the-money. Figure 4.9 considers the deficits when the volatility is increased to 
6% and 9% and represents high exchange rate volatility.  
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Figure 4.9 – Sensitivity analysis adjusting CAD/USD volatility 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
  
In figure 4.9 the effect of increasing exchange rate volatility from 3% (base) to 
6% and 9% can be seen. An increase in the exchange rate volatility to 6% results in an 
un-hedged deficit probability of 6.52% ($17,837,003) and a hedged deficit probability of 
4.52% ($10,732,565), for a call premium of $124,590,744. Consider now a volatility of 
9% and the un-hedged deficit probability increases to 9.04% ($28,946,441) and 5.06% 
($11,694,761) when hedging is in place for a call premium of $230,501,819. Increasing 
the volatility clearly shows that exchange rate volatility can considerably influence the 
wheat pool deficit. It also shows how increasingly costly it becomes to hedge exchange 
rates due to the chance the option will become profitable over time. It is interesting to 
note that when CAD/USD volatility is 9% the probability of a deficit when hedging is 
pursued is comparable to the probability of a deficit when no hedging is pursued when 
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the initial payment is 70% and not far off the deficit under the base scenario when 
hedging is present. This proves that exchange rate volatility is an important factor 
contributing to the possibility of wheat pool account deficits. It therefore is prudent to 
consider its impact and devise strategies to mitigate its adverse effect on the wheat pool 
account.  
 So far the wheat price and exchange rate volatility has been adjusted in our 
sensitivity analysis however it is interesting to see the effect of hedging the exchange rate 
risk at various strike prices to determine its effect on deficit probabilities.  Figure 4.10 
takes into consideration the base hedge at 1.05 and evaluates deficit levels at 1 and 1.1 
CAD/USD.  
 
Figure 4.10 – Sensitivity analysis adjusting call option strike prices 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
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 In figure 4.10 all scenarios share the same un-hedged deficit probability of 4.89% 
($10,790,754) and represented by the point to the far right hand side of the graph. When 
considering hedging the exchange rate at 1 the probability of a deficit is 4.21% 
(7,132,073) for a premium of $90,192,814. Hedging exchange rates at 1.05 results in a 
deficit probability of 4.29% ($9,538,920) with a premium of $36,243,985 and at 1.1 
results in a deficit probability of 4.4% ($9,598,667) for a premium of $14,050,458. It can 
be seen from figure 4.10 that the probability of a deficit is reduced very marginally the 
closer the hedge is to the starting exchange rate, however its cost increases substantially 
from just over $14 million at 1.1 to over $90 million with an at-the-money hedge of 1 
CAD/USD. This information will prove very useful when budgeting for exchange rate 
hedging and establishing acceptable deficit probabilities. If comparable deficit 
probabilities can be achieved with spending considerably less option premiums it is going 
to be more attractive for the CWB to pursue. This can be seen in the marginal difference 
in deficit reduction from hedging at 1.1 versus 1.05 with a cost savings of approximately 
$22 million dollars. It is important to realize that over the full number of iterations the 
expectation is that option premiums will equal option profits however in any one 
individual year the premium could prove worthless. A balance between option outlays 
and deficit probabilities must be attained to structure a strong long term plan for the 
CWB to mitigate unfavorable exchange rate movements. 
Appendix A.1 to A.4 show a number of results for all possible scenarios 
considered in this study. In order to visually represent all the possibilities consider figure 
4.11 which compares the premium of the call option to the probability of a deficit that 
arises for different initial prices and different hedging strategies. 
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Figure 4.11 – Probability of deficits and premiums for each initial payment level 
 
Source: Simulation results. 
 
The vertical lines in figure 4.11 represent each initial payment level hedged i.e. 
60% through 80% and depicts the intersection between option premiums and deficit 
probabilities. Each increasing point up the line represents the deficit at call option strike 
prices getting closer to the initial exchange rate of 1 CAD/USD. For example consider 
the initial payment line 75%. This represents the possible probability of deficits when 
75% of the expected PRO is hedged with currency call options. The bottom point on this 
line represents the deficit probability when no hedging is in effect. The next point up the 
line represents the deficit probability when an out of-the-money position is purchased at a 
strike price of 1.1 CAD/USD. The third point from the bottom represents the base 
scenario where call options are purchased at 1.05 and the very top point represents the 
cost and deficit probability when options are purchased at-the-money i.e.1 CAD/USD. 
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The graph shows that the premium becomes increasingly greater the closer options are 
purchased to the current exchange rate. Table 4.2 is the data used to produce figure 4.11 
showing the deficit probabilities and cost for all initial payment levels and call strike 
prices (X) considered in the study. 
 
Table 4.2 – Deficit probabilities and option premiums used in figure 4.11 
 IP = 60% IP = 65% IP = 70% 
 % deficit Premium % deficit Premium % deficit Premium 
un-hedged 0.76% $0  2.09% $0  4.89% $0  
X = 1.10 0.70% $12,043,250 1.84% $13,046,854 4.40% $14,050,458  
X = 1.05 0.64% $31,066,273 1.78% $33,655,129 4.29% $36,243,985  
X = 1.00 0.54% $77,308,126 1.78% $83,750,470 4.21% $90,192,814  
          
 IP = 75% IP = 80%   
 % deficit Premium % deficit Premium   
un-hedged 8.45% $0  14.51% $0    
X = 1.10 8.26% $15,054,062 14.09% $16,057,666   
X = 1.05 8.26% $38,832,841 13.84% $41,421,698   
X = 1.00 7.74% $96,635,157 13.61% $103,077,501   
 
Source: Simulation results. 
  
The graph also represents how deficit probabilities dramatically increase the 
greater the initial payment is to the August PRO. It is therefore important to choose the 
initial payment to establish an allowable probability of a deficit and consider the use of 
exchange rate hedging to augment that level to maximize producer payments upfront 
while minimizing the deficit probability.  
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4.7 Summary 
 Chapter four outlines a number of results of the model and how adjusting a few 
key variables affect the probability of a wheat pool account deficit. In order to grasp the 
effect of changing volatility’s and policy variables a base scenario was generated. From 
this base scenario wheat and exchange rate volatility as well as call option strike prices 
were adjusted to generate a sensitivity analysis on the base scenario. From this a number 
of key policy implications are generated. The first being determining the initial payment 
as a percentage of the PRO and second is determining at which strike price the call 
options will be purchased at.  
 Looking at figure 4.6 it can be seen that increasing the initial payment has a 
significant impact on the deficit. Increasing the initial payment from 60%, 65%, 70%, 
75% and 80% increases the deficit probability under the no-hedge base scenario from 
0.76%, 2.09%, 4.89%, and 8.45% all the way to 14.51% under an initial payment level of 
80%. 
To further analyze the results the study considers the impact of adjusting wheat 
price volatility on the base scenario. As was mentioned above increasing wheat price 
volatility to 15% results in an un-hedged deficit probability of 12.86% and a volatility of 
5% equates to an un-hedged deficit probability of 0.11%. This result tells us that when 
wheat volatility is high the CWB must consider a policy of lowering the initial payment 
level to mitigate the chance of a deficit. The exact initial payment level will depend on 
the current and forecasted wheat volatility. Hedging wheat prices could also be 
considered to help protect wheat sale prices however this approach is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
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 The focus of the study is on the effect of exchange rates on the wheat pool 
account deficit. Figure 4.8 and 4.9 shows the results when the CAD/USD exchange rate 
volatility is adjusted from 1.5%, 3%, 4.5%, 6% and 9%. This results in an un-hedged and 
(hedged) deficit probability of 4.08% (3.96%), 4.89% (4.29%), 5.1% (4.01%), 6.52% 
(4.52%) and 9.04% (5.06%) respectively. This result reiterates how significant a role the 
volatility in the CAD/USD exchange rate has on pool account deficits. The sensitivity 
analysis also concludes that the higher the volatility the greater the impact hedging has on 
decreasing the probability of a wheat pool account deficit. This can be seen as the 
increasing difference between the un-hedged deficit and hedged deficit probability 
results.  
 The second policy tool the CWB has is setting the strike price for the call options 
purchased to reduce the effect of a rising CAD. Figure 4.10 shows the results of 
purchasing call options at 1, 1.05 and 1.1 CAD/USD. Purchasing options at 1, 1.05 and 
1.1 results in an un-hedged and (hedged) deficit probability of 4.89% (4.21%), 4.89% 
(4.29%) and 4.89% (4.4%). The call premiums for these options are $90,192,814, 
$36,243,985 and $14,050,458 respectively. It is evident that purchasing options at 1 
CAD/USD results in the most effective hedge at 4.21%, however its premium is nearly 
2.5 times that of the base 1.05 CAD/USD for a marginal 0.08% reduction in deficit 
probability.  
From the sensitivity analysis it can be seen that options out-of-the money will cost 
substantially less than at the initial level of 1 CAD/USD while providing marginally less 
deficit protection. It is also conclusive that these options provide protection in the event 
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the CAD/USD exchange rate volatility increases substantially and therefore plays an 
important role in reducing the probability of a deficit.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Summary 
 Chapter five outlines a number of conclusions drawn from the results presented in 
chapter four. The chapter also outlines needs for future research and limitations of the 
study.  
 The goal of the research is to mitigate the adverse impact on the CWB wheat pool 
value when an increase in the CAD vis-à-vis the USD increases the probability of a 
deficit. This is done by evaluating the effect of purchasing CAD call options which add 
revenue to the pool account when the CAD increases therefore reducing the probability 
of a deficit. The CWB also has the ability to adjust the initial payment as a percentage of 
the PRO, which is a critical factor to consider when evaluating wheat pool deficit 
probabilities. It can therefore be seen that the CWB has two policy tools at its disposal, 
the initial payment level as a percentage of the PRO and purchasing CAD call options to 
mitigate the probability of a wheat pool account deficit.  
 Chapter four outlines the results of the base scenario and a number of sensitivity 
analysis adjustments. The base scenario takes into consideration the initial payment level 
at 60%, 65%, 70%, 75% and 80% of the PRO. It also assumes an initial volatility for 
wheat prices and CAD/USD exchange rate at 10% and 3% per month respectively. 
Additionally it assumes call options are purchased at 1.05 CAD/USD which five cents 
out-of-the money considering an initial CAD/USD exchange rate of 1. The results of the 
base scenario can be seen in figure 4.6.  
 68
 From the results presented in chapter four setting the initial payment level as a 
percentage of the PRO between 65% and 70% results in a low level of risk. This will 
depend on the volatility of wheat prices and market outlook. At this level the CWB will 
be able to provide producers with a relatively high price for wheat deliveries while 
maintaining a low probability of a deficit i.e. at 65% and 70% initial payment levels the 
un-hedged probability of a deficit is 2.09% and 4.89% respectively.  The wheat price 
sensitivity analysis shows that when the monthly volatility increased to 15% the un-
hedged probability of a deficit increased substantially to 12.89%. Therefore the CWB 
will have to gauge this volatility carefully and set initial payment levels accordingly. 
 The second policy tool is the strike price of the call options purchased. The initial 
CAD/USD exchange rate is 1 meaning that strike prices closer to 1 will be more 
expensive due to the higher probability of the option being in-the-money. The study looks 
at hedging at 1, 1.05, and 1.1 CAD/USD and found that the incremental decrease in the 
probability of a deficit was outweighed by the increase in premium for the option. The 
un-hedged probability of a deficit in the base scenario is 4.89% resulting in a benchmark 
for the call options to be compared against. Purchasing options at 1 CAD/USD, assuming 
all other variables are constant in the base scenario, yields a probability of a deficit of 
4.21% for a premium of $90,192,814. While purchasing options a 1.05 and 1.1 yields a 
probability of a deficit of 4.29% and 4.4% for a premium of $36,243,985 and 
$14,050,458 respectively. The call options therefore provide revenues to the wheat pool 
reducing the probability of deficits.  
The currency volatility sensitivity analysis shown in figure 4.8 and 4.9 illustrates 
that as the CAD/USD volatility increases from the base 3% to 4.5%, 6% and 9% the 
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probability of a deficit un-hedged and (hedged) increased to 4.89% (4.29%), 5.1% 
(4.01%), 6.52% (4.52%) 9.04% (5.06%) respectively. It can be seen that as the 
CAD/USD exchange rate volatility increases so does the probability of a deficit. It can 
also be seen that the spread in the un-hedged and hedged probability of deficits increases 
with the volatility. For example the hedged probability of a deficit when the volatility is 
9% i.e. 5.06% is approximately the same as the un-hedged probability of a deficit when 
the volatility is 4.5% i.e. 5.1%. Thus the effects of the call options are increased when the 
volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate increases. In a period of high exchange rate 
volatility and low grain price volatility hedging exchange rates could reduce the 
probability of a deficit. When grain prices are volatile the initial payment is a far greater 
determinant of wheat pool account deficits and exchange rate hedging has little impact. 
Therefore at the outset of the crop year the decision maker must take into consideration 
both current and forecasted wheat price and exchange rate volatility and determine how 
much risk he/she is willing to accept and set the initial payment and purchase option 
contracts accordingly.  
 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
 There are a number of assumptions in the model from which deficit probabilities 
are derived. Such as the volatility of wheat prices10 and exchange rates, total tonnes of 
wheat sold and the timing of sales throughout the crop year. The model assumes the pool 
is twelve months in length and makes assumptions on initial exchange rate and wheat 
price values. The study also assumes no interim or adjustment payments are made after 
                                                 
10 The monthly wheat price volatility in the FAO Food Outlook may underestimate the specific volatility 
the CWB faces in its wheat pool account. Therefore the actual volatility the CWB faces may 
increase/decrease depending on the type, amount and grade of wheat delivered in any one crop year.  
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the initial payment is set and that transaction costs are nil due to risk neutral valuation. 
The inputs and assumptions in the study were an attempt to evaluate deficit probabilities 
at approximate market conditions, however the model has the capacity to take any set of 
assumptions and cater to those requests in order to evaluate wheat pool deficit 
probabilities. 
 Future research would revolve around evaluating the effects of adjusting the 
CAD/USD exchange rate and wheat price volatility at various stages in the crop year and 
adjust the timing of wheat sales throughout the crop year. The model also has the 
capacity to evaluate the effects of the CWB making interim and adjustment payments in 
the crop year with coinciding increases/decreases in wheat price and exchange rate 
volatility. Future research will also be needed to find appropriate OTC institutions and 
evaluate their offering and premiums for call option contracts and how they can fit in the 
CWB overall risk mitigation strategy. In summary the model has the power to evaluate 
many assumptions and scenarios which will allow it to be an effective tool for setting 
initial price levels and evaluating the effectiveness of CAD call options on reducing the 
probability of a wheat pool account deficit. 
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APPENDIX A.1 – A.4 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
A.1 
 
Strike price = 1 CAD/USD           
      
Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 
Tonnes of wheat sold per 
month      1,000,000      1,000,000 
  
1,000,000 
   
1,000,000         1,000,000 
Initial wheat price $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 
Initial standard deviation 
of wheat 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 
Initial exchange rate 
CAD/USD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Initial standard deviation 
of exchange rates  3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
      
Policy variables      
Percent hedge of initial 
payment 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 
Call option strike price 
CAD/USD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
      
Results      
Probability of wheat pool 
deficit (un-hedged) 0.76% 2.09% 4.89% 8.45% 14.51% 
Average dollar value of 
deficit (un-hedged) $1,222,013 $4,073,056 $10,790,754 $24,353,955  $47,848,752 
Probability of wheat pool 
deficit (hedged) 0.54% 1.78% 4.21% 7.74% 13.61% 
Average dollar value of 
deficit (hedged) $723,946 $2,480,598 $7,132,073 $17,056,531  $35,551,801 
Call option premium $77,308,126 $83,750,470 $90,192,814 $96,635,157 $103,077,501 
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A.2 
 
(Base)  
Strike price = 1.05CAD/USD           
      
Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 
Tonnes of wheat sold per 
month 
  
1,000,000      1,000,000 
  
1,000,000 
   
1,000,000  
  
1,000,000 
Initial wheat price $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 
Initial standard deviation of 
wheat 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 
Initial exchange rate 
CAD/USD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Initial standard deviation of 
exchange rates  3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
      
Policy variables      
Percent hedge of initial 
payment 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 
Call option strike price 
CAD/USD 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 
      
Results      
Probability of wheat pool 
deficit (un-hedged) 0.76% 2.09% 4.89% 8.45% 14.51% 
Average dollar value of deficit 
(un-hedged) $1,213,793 $4,054,848 $10,813,205 $24,405,097  $48,629,859 
Probability of wheat pool 
deficit (hedged) 0.64% 1.78% 4.29% 8.26% 13.84% 
Average dollar value of deficit 
(hedged) $930,086 $3,275,535 $9,538,920 $22,509,257  $45,454,360 
Call option premium $31,066,273 $33,655,129 $36,243,985 $38,832,841 $41,421,698 
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A.3 
 
Strike price = 1.10 CAD/USD           
      
Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 
Tonnes of wheat sold per 
month 
  
1,000,000 
  
1,000,000 
  
1,000,000 
   
1,000,000  
  
1,000,000 
Initial wheat price $350 $350 $350 $350 $350 
Initial standard deviation of 
wheat 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 
Initial exchange rate CAD/USD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Initial standard deviation of 
exchange rates  3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
      
Policy variables      
Percent hedge of initial 
payment 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 
Call option strike price 
CAD/USD 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
      
Results      
Probability of wheat pool deficit 
(un-hedged) 0.76% 2.09% 4.89% 8.45% 14.51% 
Average dollar value of deficit 
(un-hedged) $1,049,904 $3,573,905 $10,790,754 $23,410,151  $46,923,654 
Probability of wheat pool deficit 
(hedged) 0.70% 1.84% 4.40% 8.26% 14.09% 
Average dollar value of deficit 
(hedged) $986,782 $3,378,559 $9,598,667 $22,477,902  $45,618,066 
Call option premium $12,043,250 $13,046,854 $14,050,458 $15,054,062 $16,057,666 
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A.4 
 
(Base) Strike price = 1.05 CAD/USD         
Sensitivity analysis         
     
Parameters 6 7 8 9 
Tonnes of wheat sold per month 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Initial wheat price $350 $350 $350  $350 
Initial standard deviation of wheat 5.00% 15.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Initial exchange rate CAD/USD 1 1 1 1
Initial standard deviation of exchange rates  3.00% 3.00% 1.50% 4.50%
     
Policy variables     
Percent hedge of initial payment 70% 70% 70% 70%
Call option strike price CAD/USD 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 
     
Results     
Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 0.11% 12.86% 4.08% 5.10%
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $104,086 $48,200,458 $9,551,490  $12,390,497 
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 0.02% 12.33% 3.96% 4.01%
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $19,563 $46,269,643 $8,874,971  $9,383,334 
Call option premium $36,243,985 $36,243,985 $5,677,571  $68,360,593 
     
Parameters 10 11 12 13 
Tonnes of wheat sold per month 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Initial wheat price $350 $350 $350  $350 
Initial standard deviation of wheat 10% 10% 10.00% 10.00%
Initial exchange rate CAD/USD 1 1 1 1
Initial standard deviation of exchange rates  6.00% 9.00% 3.00% 3.00%
     
Policy variables     
Percent hedge of initial payment 70% 70% 70% 70%
Call option strike price CAD/USD 1.05 1.05 1 1.1
     
Results     
Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 6.52% 9.04% 4.89% 4.89%
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $17,837,003 $28,946,441 $10,790,754  $10,790,754 
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 4.52% 5.06% 4.21% 4.40%
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $10,732,565 $11,694,761 $7,132,073  $9,598,667 
Call option premium $124,590,744 $230,501,819 $90,192,814  $14,050,458 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Wheat account deficit distributions (base scenario in Appendix A.2) 
 
 Deficit distribution for 60% initial pmt level un-hedged
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 Deficit distribution for 60% initial pmt level hedged
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Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 0.76% 
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $1,213,793 
Max dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $818,660,900 
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 0.70% 
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $986,782  
Max dollar value of deficit (hedged) $836,614,800 
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  Deficit distribution for 65% initial pmt level un-hedged
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  Deficit distribution for 65% initial pmt level hedged 
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Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 2.09% 
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $4,054,848  
Max dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $1,028,661,000  
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 1.84% 
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $3,378,559  
Max dollar value of deficit (hedged) $1,048,111,000  
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 Deficit distribution for 70% initial pmt level un-hedged
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 Deficit distribution for 70% initial pmt level hedged
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 Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 4.40% 
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $9,598,667  
Max dollar value of deficit (hedged) $1,259,607,000  
Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 4.89% 
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $10,813,205  
Max dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $1,238,661,000  
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 Deficit distribution for 75% initial pmt level un-hedged
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Deficit distribution for 75% initial pmt level hedged
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Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 8.45% 
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $24,405,097  
Max dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $1,448,661,000  
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 8.26% 
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $22,509,257  
Max dollar value of deficit (hedged) $1,471,103,000  
 79
 Deficit distribution for 80% initial pmt level un-hedged
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 0.6 1.2 1.8
Values in Billions
V
al
ue
s 
in
 1
0^
 -1
0
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
 
 
 Deficit distribution for 80% initial pmt level hedged
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Probability of wheat pool deficit (un-hedged) 14.51% 
Average dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $48,629,859  
Max dollar value of deficit (un-hedged) $1,658,661,000  
Probability of wheat pool deficit (hedged) 13.84% 
Average dollar value of deficit (hedged) $45,454,360  
Max dollar value of deficit (hedged) $1,682,599,000  
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